Inductive and coinductive specifications are widely used in formalizing computational systems. Such specifications have a natural rendition in logics that support fixed-point definitions. Another useful formalization device is that of recursive specifications. These specifications are not directly complemented by fixed-point reasoning techniques and, correspondingly, do not have to satisfy strong monotonicity restrictions. We show how to incorporate a rewriting capability into logics of fixed-point definitions towards additionally supporting recursive specifications. Specifically, we describe a natural deduction calculus that adds a form of "closed-world" equality-a key ingredient to supporting fixed-point definitions-to deduction modulo, a framework for extending a logic with a rewriting layer operating on formulas. We show that our calculus enjoys strong normalizability when the rewrite system satisfies general properties and we demonstrate its usefulness in specifying and reasoning about syntaxbased descriptions. Our integration of closed-world equality into deduction modulo is based on an elimination principle for this form of equality that, for the first time, allows us to require finiteness of proofs without sacrificing stability under reduction.
I. Introduction
Fixed-point definitions constitute a widely used specification device in computational settings. The process of reasoning about such definitions can be formalized within a logic by including a proof rule for introducing predicates from their definition, and a case analysis rule for eliminating such predicates in favor of the definitions through which they might have been derived. For example, given the following definition of natural numbers nat 0 = nat (s x) = nat x the introduction and elimination rules would respectively build in the capabilities of recognizing natural numbers and of reasoning by case analysis over them. When definitional clauses are positive, they are guaranteed to admit a fixed point and the logic can be proved to be consistent. Further, least (resp. greatest) fixed points can be characterized by adding an induction (resp. coinduction) rule to the logic. These kinds of treatments have been added to second-order logic [16] , [14] , type theory [18] and first-order logics [19] , [15] , [23] , [21] . The case analysis rule, which corresponds under the Curry-Howard isomorphism to pattern matching in computations, is complex in many formulations of the above ideas, and the (co)induction rules are even more so. By identifying and utilizing a suitable notion of equality, it is possible to give these rules a simple and elegant rendition. For example, the two clauses for nat can be transformed into the following form:
The case analysis rule can then be derived by unfolding a nat hypothesis into its single defining clause and using elimination rules for disjunction and equality. However, to obtain the expected behavior, equality elimination has to internalize aspects of term equality such as disjointness of constructors; e.g., the 0 branch should be closed immediately if the instantiation of x has the form s n. The introduction of this separate notion of equality, which we refer to as closed-world equality, has been central to the concise formulation of generic (co)induction rules [21] . Further, fixed-point combinators can be introduced to make the structure of (co)inductive predicates explicit rather than relying on a side table of definitions. Thus, the (inductive) definition of natural numbers may simply be rendered as μ (λNλx. x = 0 ∨ ∃y. x = s y ∧ N y). Fixed point combinators simplify and generalize the theory, notably enabling mutual (co)induction schemes from the natural (co)induction rules [2] , [3] . The logics resulting from this line of work, which we refer to as logics of fixed-point definitions, have a simple structure that is well-adapted to automated and interactive proof-search [4] , [5] . Moreover, they can be combined with features that are useful in representing and reasoning about objects with binding, to yield calculi well-suited to formalizing the metatheory of computational and logical systems [11] , [12] , [17] .
Logics featuring (co)inductive definitions can be made more powerful by adding another genre of definitions: recursive definitions based on inductive sets. Such definitions are used, for example, in the Tait-style strong normalizability arguments [20] that figure often in the meta-theory of computational systems. For the simply typed λ-calculus, this argument uses a reducibility relation specified by the following clauses:
red ι e = sn e red (t 1 → t 2 ) e = ∀e . red t 1 e ⊃ red t 2 (e e )
We assume here that ι is the sole atomic type and that sn is a predicate that recognizes strong normalizability. The specification of red looks deceptively like a fixed-point definition.
However, interpreting it as such is problematic because of the negative occurrence of red in the second clause. Notice, though, that the Tait-style argument does not require treating red as if it is given by a fixed-point definition: rather than performing case-analysis or induction on red, properties are proved about it using an (external) induction on types and the clauses for red mainly support an unfolding of the definition once the structure of a type is known [13] . More generally, recursive definitions are distinguished by the fact that they embody computations or rewriting within proofs rather than the case analysis and speculative rewriting that characterizes fixed-point based reasoning.
In this paper, we show how to incorporate the capability of recursive definitions into logics of fixed-point definitions. At a technical level, we do this by introducing least and greatest fixed points and the idea of closed-world equality into deduction modulo [8] , a framework for extending a logic with a rewriting layer that operates on formulas and terms. This rewriting layer allows for a transparent treatment of recursive definitions, but a satisfactory encoding of closedworld equality (and thus fixed-point definitions) seems outside its reach. This dichotomy actually highlights the different strengths of logics of fixed-point definitions and deduction modulo: while the former constitute excellent vehicles for dealing with (co)inductive definitions, the rewriting capability of the latter is ideally suited for supporting recursive definitions. By extending deduction modulo with closed-world equality and fixed points, we achieve a combination of these strengths. This combination also clarifies the status of our equality: we show that it is compatible with a theory on terms and is thus richer than a simple "syntactic" form of equality.
The main technical result of this paper is a strong normalizability property for our enriched version of deduction modulo. The seminal work in this context is that of Dowek and Werner [9] , who provide a proof of strong normalizability for deduction modulo that is modular with respect to the rewriting system being used. In the course of adapting this proof to our setting, we rework previous logical treatments of closedworld equality in a way that, for the first time, lets us require that proofs be finite without sacrificing their stability under reduction. For the resulting system, we are able to construct a proof of strong normalizability which follows very naturally the intended semantics of fixed-point and recursive definitions: the former are interpreted as a whole using a semantic fixedpoint, while the latter are interpreted instance by instance. Regarding the normalization of least and greatest fixed-point constructs, our work adapts that of Baelde [3] from linear to intuitionistic logic. We use a natural deduction style in presenting our logic that has the virtue of facilitating future investigations of connections with functional programming.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we motivate and present our logical system. Section III describes reductions on proofs. Section IV provides a proof of strong normalizability that is modular in the rewrite rules being considered. We use this result to facilitate recursive definitions in Section V and we illustrate their use in formalizing the meta-theory of programming languages. Section VI discusses related and future work. A long version of this paper is available with more details and proofs [6] .
II. Deduction Modulo with Fixed Points and Equality
We present our extension to deduction modulo in the form of a typing calculus for appropriately structured proof terms. This gives us a convenient tool for defining proof reductions and proving strong normalizability in later sections.
A. Formalizing closed-world equality
We first provide an intuition into our formalization of the desired form of equality. The rule for introducing an equality is the expected one: two terms are equal if they are congruent modulo the operative rewriting relation. Denoting the congruence by ≡, this rule can simply be
The novelty is in the elimination rule that must encapsulate the closed-world interpretation. This can be captured in the form of a case analysis over all unifiers of the eliminated equality; the unifiers that are relevant to consider here would instantiate variables of universal strength, called eigenvariables, in the terms. One formulation of this idea that has been commonly used in the literature is the following:
The notation csu(t, t ) is used here to denote a complete set of unifiers for t and t modulo ≡, i.e., a set of unifiers such that every unifier for the two terms is subsumed by a member of the set. The closed world assumption is expressed in the fact that Γ P needs to be proved under only these substitutions. Note in particular that the set of right premises here is empty when t and t are not unifiable, i.e., have no common instances. The equality elimination rule could have simply used the set of all unifiers for t and t . Basing it on csus instead allows the cardinality of the premise set to be controlled, typically permitting it to be reduced to a finite collection from an infinite one. However, a problem with the way this rule is formulated is that this property is not stable under substitution. For example, consider the following derivation in which x and y are variables:
If we were to apply the substitution [t 1 /x, t 2 /y] to it, the branching structure of the derivation would have to be changed to reflect the nature of a csu for t 1 and t 2 ; this could well be an infinite set. A related problem manifests itself when we need to substitute a proof π for an assumption into the derivation. If we were to work the proof substitution eagerly through each of the premises in the equality elimination rule, it would be necessary to modify the structure of π to accord with the term substitution that indexes each of the premise derivations. In the context of deduction modulo, the instantiation in π can create new opportunities for rewriting formulas. Since the choice of the "right" premise cannot be determined upfront, the eager propagation of proof substitutions into equality eliminations can lead to speculative rewriting that greatly limits the form of recursive definitions that we can permit in the logical system. We avoid these problems by formulating equality elimination in a way that allows for the suspension of term and proof substitutions. Specifically, this rule is
Here, Γ Γθ means that there is a derivation of Γ Q for any Q ∈ Γθ. This premise allows us to delay the propagation of proof substitutions over the premises that represent the case analysis part of the rule. Notice also that we consider csus for t and t and not tθ and t θ over these premises, i.e., the application of the substitution θ is also suspended. These substitutions must eventually be applied: this becomes the task of the reduction rule for equality that also simultaneously selects the right branch in the case analysis.
Our equality elimination rule also has the pleasing property of allowing the structure of proofs to be preserved under substitutions. For example, the proof
The second premise in our proposed equality elimination rule embodies a form of cut. However, such cuts do not compromise the utility of the meta-theoretic properties that we show for our logic. For example, the fact that they can occur only within normal forms of specific types allows us to extract consistency from proof normalizability, as we see in Lemma 3. Interestingly, our formulation of the rule may also have a beneficial impact on automating proof search. Specifically, it provides a means to generalize equalities seen when exploring provability and thereby to replace intractable unification problems with ones that have simple solutions.
B. The logic μNJ modulo
The syntax of our formulas is based on a language of typed λ-terms. We do not describe this language in detail and assume only that it is equipped with standard notions of variables and substitutions. We distinguish o as the type of propositions. Term types, denoted by γ, are ones that do not contain o.
Predicates are expressions of type γ 1 → . . . → γ n → o. Both formulas and predicates are denoted by P or Q. We use p or q for predicate variables and a for predicate constants. Terms are expressions of term types, and shall be denoted by t, u or v. We use x, y or z for term variables. All expressions are considered up to βand η-conversion. In addition to that basic syntactic equality, we assume a congruence relation ≡. In Section V, we will describe conditions on such a congruence relation that are sufficient for ensuring the consistency of the logic.
Definition 1.
A unifier of u and v is a substitution θ such that uθ ≡ vθ. A complete set of unifiers for u and v, written csu(u, v) is a set { θ i } i of unifiers of u and v, such that any other unifier of u and v is of the form θ i θ for some i and θ . Note that complete sets of unifiers may not be unique. However, this ambiguity will be harmless in our setting. Definition 2. Formulas are built as follows: Every predicate variable occurrence must be within such an operator, bound by the first abstraction in it. An occurrence of p in a formula is positive if it is on the left of an even number of implications, and it is negative otherwise and λpλ x.P is said to be monotonic (resp. antimonotonic) if p occurs only positively (resp. negatively) in P. We restrict the first argument of fixed-point combinators to be monotonic operators.
We now introduce a language of proof terms, and define type assignment. The terms and typing rules for all but the equality and fixed point cases are standard (e.g., see [9] ). Following the Curry-Howard correspondence, (proof-level) types correspond to formulas, typing derivations correspond to proofs, and the reduction of proof terms corresponds to proof normalization. The guidelines determining the form of the new proof terms are that all information needed for reduction should be included in them and that type checking should be easily decidable. The details of our choices should become clear when we present the typing rules. Definition 3. Proof terms, denoted by π and ρ, are given by the following syntax rules:
Here and later, we use α, β, γ to denote proof variables, and σ to denote substitutions for proof variables. The notation
Variables bound in proof terms are assumed to be new in instances of typing rules, i.e., they should not occur free in the base sequent. Specifically, α, β, x are assumed to be new in the introduction rules for implication, universal quantification and greatest fixed-point, as well as elimination rules for disjunction, existential quantification, equality and least fixed-point. Fig. 1 . μNJ: Natural deduction modulo with equality and least and greatest fixed points (θ i .π i ) i in the equality elimination construct stands for a finite, possibly empty, collection of subterms. In the expression θ.π, all free variables of π must be in the range of the substitution θ. Finally, the notation x.π or α.π denotes a binding construct, i.e., x (resp. α) is bound in π. As usual, terms are identified up to a renaming of bound variables, and renaming is used to avoid capture when propagating a substitution under a binder.
Typing judgments are relativized to contexts that are assignments of types to finite sets of proof variables. We denote contexts by Γ, written perhaps with subscripts and superscripts.
Definition 4.
A proof term π has type P under the context Γ if Γ π : P is derivable using the rules in Figure 1 . We also say that Γ σ : Γ holds if Γ and σ have the same domain and Γ σ(α) : Γ(α) holds for each α in that domain.
C. Expressiveness of the logic
The logic μNJ modulo inherits from logics of fixed-point definitions a simplicity in the treatment of (co)inductive sets and relations and from deduction modulo the ability to blend computation and deduction in the course of reasoning. We illustrate this aspect through a few simple examples here.
Natural numbers may be specified through the following least fixed point predicate:
Specialized for this predicate, the least fixed point rules immediately give rise to the following standard derived rules:
Having natural numbers, we can easily obtain the rest of Heyting arithmetic. Addition may be defined as an inductive relation, but the congruence also allows it to be defined more naturally as a term-level function, equipped with the rewrite rules 0 + y y and (s x) + y s (x + y). Treating it in the latter way allows us to exploit the standard dichotomy between deduction and computation in deduction modulo to shorten proofs [7] . For example, (s 0) + (s 0) = s (s 0) can be proved in one step by using the fact that the two terms in the equation are congruent to each other. More general properties about addition defined in this way must be conditioned by assumptions about the structure of the terms. For instance, commutativity of addition should be stated as follows:
This proposition can be proved by induction on the nat hypotheses, with addition being performed implicitly through the congruence when the structure of the first summand becomes known. Note that we do not have to know how to compute csus modulo arithmetic to build that derivation: all that is needed is the substitutivity principle ∀x∀y. x = y ⊃ P x ⊃ P y which only involves shallow unification. As usual, we consider reducing proof terms in which an elimination rule for a logical symbol immediately follows an introduction rule for the same symbol. Substitutions for both term-level and proof-level variables play an important role in describing such reductions. They are defined as usual, extended as shown on Figure 2 for equality and for the least and greatest fixed-point constructs. Note that substitutions are suspended over the parts representing case analysis in the equality elimination rule as discussed earlier. The next two lemmas show that this treatment of substitution is coherent. Lemma 1. Term-level substitution preserves type assignment: Γ π : P implies Γθ πθ : Pθ.
Proof: This is easily checked by induction on the typing derivation. An interesting case is that of equality elimination. Consider the following derivation:
By the induction hypothesis, Γ θ πθ : uθ θ = vθ θ and Γ θ σθ : Γθ θ have derivations. From these we build the derivation
Lemma 2. If Γ π : P and Γ σ : Γ then Γ πσ : P.
Proof: This is shown also by induction on the typing derivation. An interesting case, again, is that of equality elimination. Consider the following derivation:
By the induction hypothesis, Γ πσ : uθ = vθ and Γ σ σ : Γ θ have derivations. From this we build the derivation
The most interesting reduction rules are those for the least and greatest fixed-point operators. In the former case, the rule must apply to a proof of the form
This redex can be eliminated by generating a proof of Γ S t directly from the derivation of Γ π : B (μ B) t: doing this effectively means that we move the redex (cut) deeper into the iteration that introduces the least fixed point. To realize this transformation, we proceed as follows:
• Using the derivation π , we can get a proof of S t from B S t. Thus, the task reduces to generating a proof of B S t from B (μ B) t. • Using again π , we get a derivation for Γ, β : μ B x δ μ (β, x.α.π ) : S x. If we can show how to "lift" this derivation over the operator λp. (B p t) , we obtain the needed derivation of B S t from π : B (μ B) t. For the latter step, we use the notion of functoriality [14] . For any monotonic operator B, we define the functor F B for which the following typing rule is admissible:
Definition 5 (Functoriality, F B (π)). Let B be an operator of type ( γ → o) → o, and π be a proof such that α : P x π : P x. We define F + B ( x.α.π) of type B P ⊃ B P for a monotonic B and F − B ( x.α.π) of type B P ⊃ B P for an antimonotonic B by induction on the maximum depth of an occurrence of p in B p through the rules in Figure 3 . In these rules, * denotes any polarity (+ or −) and − * denotes the complementary one. We write F + B ( x.α.π) more simply as F B ( x.α.π). Checking the admissibility of the typing rule pertaining to F B is mostly routine. We illustrate how this is to be done by considering the least fixed point case in Figure 4 ; the greatest fixed point case is shown in [6] .
The full collection of reduction rules is presented in Figure 5 . Note that the reduction rule for equality is not deterministic as stated: determinism can be forced if needed by suitable assumptions on csus or by forcing a particular choice of θ i and θ in case of multiple possibilities. Theorem 1 (Subject reduction). If Γ π : P and π → π then Γ π : P. Proof: This follows from the above substitution lemmas. For example, consider the equality case. If uθ ≡ vθ then δ = (Γ , θ, σ, u, v, P, refl, (θ i .π i ) i ) → π i θ σ where θ = θ i θ . We have a derivation of Γ θ i π i : Pθ i . Hence, by applying θ and using Lemma 1, Γ θ π i θ : Pθ must have a derivation. Finally, since Γ σ : Γ θ has a derivation, by Lemma 2 there must be one for Γ π i θ σ : Pθ. Proposition 1. For any proof terms π, π and ρ and any term t, π → π implies π[ρ/α] → π [ρ/α] and π[t/x] → π [t/x].
Proof: Both implications are easily checked.
A proof term is normal if it contains no redexes and it is strongly normalizable if every reduction sequence starting from it terminates in a normal proof term. The set of strongly normalizable proof terms is denoted by SN. The normalizability of proof terms can be coupled with the following observation to show the (conditional) consistency of the logic. Lemma 3. If ≡ is defined by a confluent rewrite system that rewrites terms to terms and atomic propositions to propositions, then π : ⊥ is not derivable for any normal π.
Proof: The argument, following the usual pattern, is based on an analysis of the normal forms for proofs. More details are provided in [6] .
IV. Strong Normalizability
In a fashion similar to [9] , we now establish strong normalizability for proof reductions when the congruence relation satisfies certain general conditions. The proof is based on the framework of reducibility candidates, and borrows elements from earlier work in linear logic [3] regarding fixed-points.
Definition 6.
A proof term is neutral iff it is not an introduction, i.e., it is a variable or an elimination construct.
Definition 7. A set R of proof terms is a reducibility candidate if (1) R ⊆ SN;
(2) π ∈ R and π → π implies π ∈ R; and (3) if π is neutral and all of its one-step reducts are in R, then π ∈ R. We denote by C the set of all reducibility candidates.
Conditions (2,3) are positive and compatible with (1) so that for any subset S of SN there is a least candidate containing S . We refer to the operation that yields this set as saturation. Reducibility candidates, equipped with inclusion, form a complete lattice: the intersection of a family of candidates gives their infimum and the saturated union gives their supremum. Having a complete lattice, we can define least and greatest fixed points of monotonic operators. The ordering and the observations about it lift pointwise for functions from terms to candidates, which we call predicate candidates. We use X and Y ambiguously to denote candidates and predicate candidates.
Definition 8.
A pre-model M is an assignment of a function â from |γ 1 | × . . . × |γ n | to C to each predicate constant a of type γ 1 → . . . γ n → o. Here, |γ| denotes the set of (potentially open) terms of type γ. Definition 9. Let M be a pre-model, let P be a formula and let E be a context assigning predicate candidates of the right types to at least the free predicate variables in P. We define the candidate |P| E , called the interpretation of P, by recursion on the structure of P as shown in Figure 6 .
To justify this definition, we show simultaneously by an induction on P that |P| E is a candidate and that it is monotonic (resp. antimonotonic) in E(p) for any variable p that only occurs positively (resp. negatively) in P; the latter two facts ensure that the fixed points assumed in the definition actually exist, antimonotonicity being needed because of the covariance in implication formulas. Preservation of (anti)monotonicity and satisfaction of the conditions for reducibility candidates are readily verified in all but the fixed point cases. For the least fixed point case, |μ B t| E is easily seen to be a candidate provided it is well-defined, i.e., if lfp(φ) exists for φ as in the definition. But this must be so: the induction hypothesis applied to B p t ensures that φ is a monotonic mapping, hence it has a least fixed point in the lattice of predicate candidates. For monotonicity, consider E and E differing only on a variable p that occurs only positively in μ B t, with E(p) ⊆ E (p). Let |μ B t| E = lfp(φ ) t. Unfolding and using the induction hypothesis, we have φ(X) ⊆ φ (X) for any candidate X, and in particular φ(|μ B t| E ) ⊆ φ (|μ B t| E ) = |μ B t| E . The least fixed point being contained in all prefixed points, we obtain the expected result: |μ B t| E = lfp(φ) ⊆ |μ B t| E . Antimonotonicity is established in a symmetric fashion. The treatment of the greatest fixed point case is similar. Notation 1. If P is a predicate of type γ → o, |P| E denotes the mapping t → |P t| E . If B is of type ( γ → o) → o, |B| E denotes the mapping X → |B p| E+ p,X and if B is a predicate operator of type ( γ → o) → γ → o, |B| E denotes the mapping X → t → |B p t| E+ p,X . For conciseness we write directly |B X t| E for |λp. B p t| E X or, equivalently, |B| E X t. 
|a t 1 . . . t n | E =â(t 1 , . . . , t n ) |P ⊃ Q| E = { π ∈ SN | π → * λα.π 1 implies π 1 [π /α] ∈ |Q| E for any π ∈ |P| E } |P ∧ Q| E = { π ∈ SN | π → * π 1 , π 2 implies π 1 ∈ |P| E and π 2 ∈ |Q| E } |P 1 6 . Interpretation of formulas as candidates could hold in non-trivial semantic interpretations. Second, the suspension of proof-level substitutions in equality elimination goes hand in hand with the independence of interpretations for different predicate instances, which in turn is necessary to interpret recursive definitions. Indeed, when applying a prooflevel substitution σ ∈ |Γ| E on an eager equality elimination, we are forced to apply the csu substitutions on σ, and we need σ ∈ |Γθ i | E which essentially forces us to have a termindependent interpretation [3] . We now address the adequacy of functoriality, induction and coinduction. Lemma 6. Let π be a proof, and let X and X be predicate candidates such that π[ t/ x] is (α : X t X t)-reducible for any t. If B is a monotonic (resp. antimonotonic) operator, then
Let π be a proof and X a predicate candidate. If π[ t/ x] is (α : |B|X t X t)-reducible for any t, then δ μ (β, x.α.π) is (β : |μB t | X t )-reducible for any t . Lemma 8. Let π be a proof and X a predicate candidate. If π[ t/ x] is (α : X t |B|X t)-reducible for any t, then ν(β, x.α.π) is (β : X t |νB t |)-reducible for any t .
Proof: These lemmas must be proved simultaneously, in a generalized form that is detailed in [6] . There is no essential difficulty in proving the functoriality lemma, using previously proved adequacy properties as well as the other two lemmas for the fixed point cases. The next two lemmas are the interesting ones, since they involve using the properties of the fixed point interpretations to justify the (co)induction rules. In the case of induction, we need to establish that δ μ (ρ, x.α.π) ∈ X t when ρ ∈ |μB t|. In order to do this, it suffices to show that
This follows from the fact that Y is a pre-fixed point of the operator φ such that |μB| = lfp(φ), which can be proved easily using the adequacy property for functoriality. We proceed similarly for the coinduction rule, showing that Y := t → { π ∈ SN | π → * ν(ρ, x.α.π) implies ρ ∈ X t and π[ t / x] is (α : X t |B|X t )-reducible for any t } is a post-fixed point of the operator φ such that |νB| = gfp(φ).
In both cases, note that the candidate Y is a priori not the interpretation of any predicate; this is where we use the power of reducibility candidates.
Theorem 2 (Adequacy). Let ≡ be a congruence, M be a premodel of ≡ and Γ π : P be a derivable judgment. Then πσ ∈ |P| for any substitution σ ∈ |Γ|.
Proof: By induction on the height of π, using the previous adequacy properties. The usual corollaries hold. Since variables belong to any candidate by condition (3), we can take σ to be the identity substitution, and obtain that any well-typed proof is strongly normalizable. Together with Lemma 3, this means that our logic is consistent.
V. Recursive Definitions
We now identify a class of rewrite rules relative to which we can always build a pre-model. This class supports recursive definitions whose use we illustrate through a sound formalization of a Tait-style argument.
A. Recursive rewriting that admits a pre-model
The essential idea behind recursive definitions is that they are formed gradually, following the inductive structure of one of their arguments, or more generally a well-founded order on arguments. In order to reflect this idea into a pre-model construction, we need to identify all the atom interpretations that could be involved in the interpretation of a given formula. This is the purpose of the next definition. Definition 12. We say that P may occur in Q when P = P θ, P occurs in Q, and θ is a substitution for variables quantified over in Q.
For example, (a t) may occur in (a x ∧ ∃y. a y) for any t. Theorem 3. Let ≡ be a congruence defined by a rewrite system rewriting terms to terms and atomic propositions to propositions, and let M be a pre-model of ≡. Consider the addition of new predicate symbols a 1 , . . . , a n in the language, together with the extension of the congruence resulting from the addition of rewrite rules of the form a i t B. There is a pre-model of the extended congruence in the extended language, provided that the following conditions hold.
(1) If (a i t)θ ≡ (a i t )θ , a i t B and a i t B , then Bθ ≡ B θ . (2) There exists a well-founded order ≺ such that a j t ≺ (a i t)θ whenever a i t B and a j t may occur in B θ.
Note that condition (1) is not obviously satisfied, even when there is a single rule per atom. Consider, for example, a (0 × x) a x in a setting where 0 × x ≡ 0: our condition requires that a x ≡ a y for any x and y, which is a priori not guaranteed. Condition (2) restricts the use of quantifiers but still allows useful constructions. Thus, consider the Ackermann relation, built using a double induction on its first two parameters: ack 0 x (s x)
, ack (s x) 0 y ack x (s 0) y and ack (s x) (s y) z ∃r. ack (s x) y r ∧ ack x r z. The third rule requires that ack x r z ≺ ack (s x) (s y) z for any x, y, z and r, which is indeed satisfied with a lexicographic ordering. Proof: We only present the main idea here; a detailed proof may be found in [6] . We first build pre-models M ai t that are compatible with instances a j t B of the new rewrite rules for a j t a i t. This is done gradually following the order ≺, using a well-founded induction on a i t. We build M ai t by aggregating smaller pre-models M a j t for a j t ≺ a i t, and adding the interpretationâ i t. To define it, we consider rule instances of the form a i t B. If there is none we use a dummy interpretation:â i t = SN. Otherwise, condition (1) imposes that there is essentially a single possible such rewrite modulo the congruence, so it suffices to choose |B| as the interpretation a i t to satisfy the new rewrite rules. Finally, we aggregate interpretations from all the pre-models M ai t to obtain a premodel of the full extended congruence.
This result can be used to obtain pre-models for complex definition schemes, such as ones that iterate and interleave groups of fixed-point and recursive definitions. Consider, for example, a (s n) a n ⊃ a (s n). While this rewrite rule does not directly satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3, it can be rewritten into the form a (s n) μQ. a n ⊃ Q, which does satisfy these conditions.
B. An application of recursive definitions
Our example application is the formalization of the Taitstyle argument of strong normalizability for the simply typed λ-calculus. We assume term-level sorts tm and ty corresponding to representations of λ-terms and simple types, and symbols ι : ty, arrow : ty → ty → ty, app : tm → tm → tm and abs : (tm → tm) → tm. We identify well-formed types through an inductive predicate:
We assume a definition of term reduction and strong normalization, denoting the latter predicate by sn. Finally, we define red m t, expressing that m is a reducible λ-term of type t, by the following rewrite rules:
This definition satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3, taking as ≺ the order induced by the subterm ordering on the second argument of red. We can thus safely use it. With these definitions, our logic allows us to closely follow the strong normalization proof presented in [13] . For instance, consider proving that reducible terms are strongly normalizing:
The paper proof is by induction on types, which corresponds in the formalization to an elimination on isty t. In the base case, we have to derive red m ι ⊃ sn m which is simply an instance of P ⊃ P modulo our congruence. In the arrow case, we must prove red m (arrow t t ) ⊃ sn m. The hypothesis red m (arrow t t ) is congruent to ∀n. red n t ⊃ red (app m n) t and we can show that variables are always reducible, 1 which gives us red (app m x) t . From there, we obtain sn (app m x) by induction hypothesis, from which we can deduce sn m with a little more work.
The full formalization, shown in [6] , has been tested using the proof assistant Abella [10] . The logic that underlies Abella features fixed-point definitions, closed-world equality and generic quantification. The last notion is useful when dealing with binding structures, and we have employed it in our formalization although it is not available yet in our logic. Abella does not actually support recursive definitions. To get around this fact, we have entered the one we need as an inductive definition, and ignored the warning provided about the non-monotonic clause while making sure to use an unfolding of this inductive definition in the proof only when this is allowed for recursive definitions. In the future, we plan to extend Abella to support recursive definitions based on the theory developed in this paper. This would mean allowing such definitions as a separate class, building in a test that they satisfy the criterion described in Theorem 3 and properly restricting the use of these definitions in proofs. Such an extension is obviously compatible with all the current capabilities of Abella and would support additional reasoning that is justifiably sound.
VI. Related and Future Work
The logical system that we have developed is obviously related to deduction modulo. In essence, it extends that system with a simple yet powerful treatment of fixed-point definitions. The additional power is obtained from two new features: fixedpoint combinators and closed-world equality. If provability is the only concern, the capabilities arising from these features may be encoded already in deduction modulo. Dowek and Werner provide an encoding of arithmetic in deduction modulo, and also show how to build pre-models for some fixedpoint constructs [9] . Also, Allali [1] shows how an algorithmic version of equality can be defined through the congruence. This allows equations to be simplified by computing, thereby simulating some aspects of closed-world equality. However, realizing the principle of substitutivity requires a complex encoding involving inductions on the term structures. In any case, provability is not our only concern here; in general, we do not follow the project of deduction modulo to have a logic as basic as possible in which stronger systems are then encoded. Rather, we seek to obtain meaningful proof structures, whose study can reveal useful information. For instance, in the context of proof-search, it has been shown that a direct treatment of fixed-point definitions allows for stronger focused proof systems [3] which have served as a basis for several proof-search implementations [4] , [5] . This goal also underlies our not using a powerful system like the Calculus of Inductive Constructions [18] which obviously supports inductive as well as recursive definitions; here again we highlight the simplicity of our (co)induction rules and of our rich equality elimination principle.
Our logic is also related to logics of fixed-point definitions [19] , [15] , [23] . The system we have described improves on these logics in that it adds to them a rewriting capability. As we have seen, this capability can be used to support recursive definitions 2 as well as to blend computation and deduction in natural ways. Our work also makes contributions to the understanding of closed-world equality. We have shown that it is compatible with an equational theory on terms. We have, in addition, resolved some problematic issues related to this notion that affect the stability of finite proofs under reduction. This has allowed us to prove for the first time a strong normalizability result for logics of fixed-point definitions. Our calculus is, at this stage, missing a treatment of generic quantification present in some of the alternative logics [11] , [12] , [17] . We plan to include this feature in the future, and do not foresee any difficulty in doing so since it has typically been added in a modular fashion to such logics. This addition would make our logic an excellent choice for formalizing the meta-theory of computational and logical systems.
An important topic for further investigation of our system is proof search. The distinction between computation and deduction is critical for theorem proving with fixed point definitions. For instance, in the Tac system [5] , which is based on logics of definitions, automated (co)inductive theorem proving relies heavily on ad-hoc annotations that identify computations. In that context, our treatment of recursive definitions seems like a good candidate for a more principled separation of computation and deduction. Finally, we would like to study the impact of our new equality elimination rule on proof search. This rule seems difficult to analyze at first. However, we hope to gain some insights from studying its use in settings where the old rule (which it subsumes) is practically satisfactory, progressively moving to newer contexts where it offers advantages. As we have indicated in Section II-A, this rule can allow us to construct finite, and, hence, practical proofs in settings that initially involve equalities for which any complete set of unifiers must be infinite. This affords us the means to at least pose the next important question, whether the flexibility of the proof system can be exploited to benefit within an automated theorem prover.
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